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Default matrimonial property regimes  
and the principles of European family law –  




4  South African default regimes
As in Europe,108 prospective spouses in South Africa have wide-ranging party 
autonomy and they may select the matrimonial property system they would like to 
make applicable to their marriage by entering into an antenuptial contract before 
their marriage.109 If they do not exercise this freedom of contract, the default 
matrimonial property system of universal community of property will apply to their 
marriage.110 There is, in fact, a rebuttable presumption that when a couple enters 
into a civil marriage the pair is marrying in community of property.111 Community 
of property is therefore referred to as the primary matrimonial property system 
of South Africa.112 If prospective spouses do enter into an antenuptial contract to 
exclude community of property, section 2 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 
1984 makes provision for the accrual system almost as a second default matrimonial 
property system. Spouses do not even need to state in their antenuptial contract that 
they would like to get married with the accrual system, as all marriages concluded 
out of community of property since the coming into operation of the Matrimonial 
Property Act on 1 November 1984 are subject to the accrual system, unless the 
parties expressly exclude this system. The accrual system can therefore be regarded 
as the secondary matrimonial property system in South Africa. Both these systems 
will be scrutinised as regards their operation firstly upon conclusion of the marriage 
and secondly upon dissolution through divorce. Attention will also be paid to 
specific problems experienced with these two systems in practice and certain areas 
of uncertainty.
* See 2015 TSAR 363 for part 1.
** Professor of Private Law, University of South Africa.
*** Emeritus Professor, University of Leuven.
108 See par 2.
109 Sonnekus “Grense aan kontrakvryheid vir eggenote én voornemende eggenote? (deel 2)” 2010 TSAR 
217 234; Sonnekus “Huweliksvoorwaardes én kontrakteervryheid onder druk” 2014 TSAR 580. 
110 Sonnekus “Grense aan kontrakvryheid vir eggenote én voornemende eggenote? (deel 1)” 2010 TSAR 
53 56; Sonnekus (n 109 (2014)) 580. See also Barratt (ed) Law of Persons and the Family (2012) 279.
111 Edelstein v Edelstein 1952 3 SA 1 (A) 10 referring to Voet 23 2 91; Brummund v Brummund’s Estate 
1993 2 SA 494 (NmHC) 498 quoting Hahlo The South African Law of Husband and Wife (1985) 157, 
where he says that “community comes into being as soon as the marriage is solemnized” and that 
“[e]very marriage is presumed to be in community until the contrary is proved”.
112 Heaton South African Family Law (2010) 65.
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4.1  Universal community of property
4.1.1  Concept
Where spouses get married in community of property their separate estates are 
merged into a single joint estate for the duration of the marriage.113 As the system 
entails a universal community of property, the spouses share everything – all their 
assets and all their debts.114
As far as their assets are concerned, the spouses become tied co-owners in 
undivided and indivisible half-shares of all the assets they respectively have at the 
time of their marriage and all the assets which they acquire during the marriage.115 
Transfer of ownership is automatic and no delivery of movable property, registration 
of immovable property, cession of rights and so on, is necessary.116 There are, 
however, some exceptions to the general rule that all assets of both spouses become 
joint assets. In terms of common law and legislation either spouse may also own 
separate property which is excluded from the joint estate.117 Separate property 
comprises the following:118 assets excluded from the joint estate by the spouses in 
an antenuptial contract;119 testamentary bequests or donations made by a third party 
to a spouse subject to the express condition that the asset(s) are excluded from the 
joint estate of the spouses; property in which a spouse holds a limited or inalienable 
interest, such as a usufruct or a fideicommissum; engagement or wedding presents 
from a husband to his wife; benefits accruing to a wife in terms of the Friendly 
Societies Act 25 of 1956; delictual damages from third parties for non-patrimonial 
loss as provided for by section 18(a) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984; 
delictual damages for personal injury inflicted by the other spouse as provided 
for by section 18(b) of the Matrimonial Property Act; costs awarded to a spouse 
in matrimonial proceedings which do not result in the marriage being dissolved; 
and property attained through an offence and the proceeds of unlawful activities 
excluded from the joint estate by the court in terms of the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act 121 of 1998.
Although the fruits of separate property generally fall within the joint estate, 
assets replacing separate property, except assets replacing delictual damages for 
non-patrimonial loss from third parties and delictual damages for personal injury 
inflicted by the other spouse, are also excluded from the joint estate.120
113 Du Plessis v Pienaar NO 2002 4 All SA 311 (SCA) 312g. See also Heaton (n 112) 66; Hahlo (n 111) 
157-158.
114 Barratt (n 110) 279; Sonnekus (n 109 (2014)) 580.
115 Estate Sayle v Commissioner for Inland Renvenue 1945 AD 388 395-396; De Wet v Jurgens 1970 3 
SA 38 (A) 46; Ex parte Menzies et Uxor 1993 3 SA 799 (C) 811E-G; the Du Plessis case (n 113) 312g; 
Corporate Liquidators (Pty) Ltd v Wiggill 2006 4 All SA 439 (T) par 13; Zulu v Zulu 2008 4 SA 12 
(D) 15G-H; Mazibuko v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2009 6 SA 479 (SCA) par 48.
116 the Menzies case (n 115); the Wiggill case (n 115). See also Heaton (n 112) 67; Bakker “Nature of 
ownership in immovable property of the joint estate on divorce” 2007 THRHR 515 519; Hahlo (n 111) 
162. 
117 Heaton (n 112) 67; Klopper “Domestic assault with a motor vehicle” 2007 THRHR 672 678; Sonnekus 
“Privé bates en sekwestrasie in huwelik in gemeenskap van goed” 1994 TSAR 143 144.
118 Barratt (n 110) 282-283; Heaton (n 112) 67-70; Van Heerden, Cockrell and Keightley (eds) Boberg’s 
Law of Persons and the Family (1999) 185-186; Hahlo (n 111) 164-169; Klopper (n 117) 678.
119 Sonnekus (n 117) 143 points out that spouses cannot by any other agreement exclude assets from the 
joint estate and allot them to the separate property of one spouse.
120 Heaton (n 112) 67-70.
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Upon marriage all debts of the spouses, including their existing debts at the time 
of marriage, become part of the joint estate.121 Section 17(5) of the Matrimonial 
Property Act provides that where a debt is recoverable from a joint estate, the spouse 
who incurred the debt or both spouses jointly may be sued therefor, and where a debt 
has been incurred for household necessaries, the spouses may be sued jointly or 
severally therefor. The spouses are nonetheless joint debtors for such joint debts.122 
Creditors of the spouses can look to the joint estate as well as the separate property 
of both spouses for recovery of a joint debt.123
Spouses could also incur separate debts. In this regard, section 19 of the Matrimonial 
Property Act determines that where a spouse is liable for the payment of damages 
by reason of a delict committed by him or her, such damages are recoverable, firstly, 
from that spouse’s separate property, and secondly, if there is no or insufficient 
separate property, from the joint estate. In so far as the damages are recovered from 
the joint estate, an adjustment must be made in favour of the other spouse or his or 
her estate when the joint estate is divided. It is presently unclear whether the same 
rules as set out in section 19 would also apply to other separate debts of a spouse, 
such as criminal fines and a spouse’s maintenance obligations towards his or her 
parents, siblings and children from a previous marriage or relationship, or whether 
the general rule that these debts become joint debts still applies.124
Although the spouses have equal independent powers to control or manage the 
joint estate and incur debts that bind the joint estate,125 they have to obtain each 
other’s consent for certain important transactions, such as the alienation or burdening 
of immovable property, entering into a suretyship, entering into certain contracts, 
purchasing a house, receiving credit under a credit agreement, selling shares or 
other assets held mainly as investments, withdrawing money from each other’s 
bank accounts, instituting or defending legal proceedings and selling furniture or 
other household effects.126 No consent is, however, necessary for some of the above 
transactions that a spouse performs in the ordinary course of his or her profession, 
trade or business.127 Someone who is married in community of property may 
therefore in the ordinary course of his or her profession, trade or business conclude 
a contract to alienate immovable property, receive credit, alienate shares, purchase 
land, bind himself or herself as surety and institute or defend legal proceedings 
without spousal consent.128
121 Barratt (n 110) 283; Heaton (n 112) 71; Hahlo (n 111) 170.
122 Nedbank Ltd v Van Zyl 1990 2 SA 469 (A); the Du Plessis case (n 113). 
123 the Du Plessis case (n 113) 313i-j. Nugent JA stated that “[t]he fact that some of her [the wife’s] 
property is separately owned is relevant to the manner in which the property may be dealt with by the 
spouses inter se and to their rights upon dissolution of the marriage but does not affect the ordinary 
right of a creditor to look to all the property of the debtor in satisfaction of a debt” 314a-b. See also 
Sonnekus “Insolvensie by huwelike in gemeenskap van goed” 1986 TSAR 92 97.
124 See Heaton (n 112) 71-73.
125 s 14 and 15(1) of the Matrimonial Property Act.
126 s 15(2), 17(1) and 15(3) of the Matrimonial Property Act. Under the act, different kinds of consent, 
ranging from prior written consent attested by two competent witnesses to mere oral or tacit consent, 
are required for these transactions.
127 s 15(6) of the Matrimonial Property Act. 
128 See Strydom v Engen Petroleum Ltd 2013 2 SA 187 (SCA) and Sonnekus “Beskerming vervat in die 
Wet op Huweliksgoedere 88 van 1984 – vir wie?” 2013 TSAR 544 558, who feels that the court in 
Strydom too easily found that the relevant transaction was performed in the ordinary course of the 
husband’s profession, trade or business.
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The effect of the consent requirements is that both spouses have limited capacity 
to transact in certain situations.129 These requirements are, however, necessary 
to protect each spouse against maladministration by the other.130 Section 15(9) of 
the Matrimonial Property Act deals partly with the effect of lack of consent. It 
protects bona fide third parties who transact with a spouse without knowing that 
the required consent has not been obtained by deeming the transaction as valid 
and concluded with the required consent.131 It also protects the non-consenting 
spouse by providing that where the transacting spouse knows or ought reasonably 
to have known that he will probably not obtain the required consent and the joint 
estate suffers a loss as a result of the transaction, an adjustment must be effected in 
favour of the non-consenting spouse upon the division of the joint estate.132 It has 
been pointed out that this protective measure is potentially a weak remedy, because 
the non-consenting spouse can recover only when the joint estate is divided, and 
there might be insufficient assets in the joint estate to effect full compensation.133 
Further, the act makes no provision for the effect of lack of consent where the 
third party was mala fide.134 Although it appears from case law that transactions 
which violate the consent requirements are void135 and that the non-consenting 
spouse may recover directly from the third party whatever he or she acquired, it is 
unclear what the particular legal mechanisms of recovery are.136 It is also unclear 
whether the protective measures of the Matrimonial Property Act are primarily for 
the non-consenting spouse or primarily for third parties transacting with spouses 
married in community of property.137 The act does, however, make provision for 
future protection against transactions which require the consent of both spouses 
but which have been performed by one spouse without the required consent. In this 
regard section 16(2) of the Matrimonial Property Act provides that the court may 
on application of the prejudiced spouse suspend any power of the other spouse in 
respect of the joint estate for a definite or indefinite period if the court is satisfied 
that the order is necessary for the protection of the prejudiced spouse’s interests in 
the joint estate. A more drastic remedy which would also be available to a prejudiced 
spouse is an application for the immediate division of the joint estate in terms of 
section 20 of the Matrimonial Property Act.138 A proviso to the approval of such an 
application is, however, that no other person will be prejudiced by the order.
129 Barratt “Clarifying protection of spouses married in community of property?” 2011 Stell LR 272 
274; Heaton (n 112) 75; Sonnekus “Huweliksvermoënsregtelike aspekte van egskeidings en verband-
versekerde lenings” 2005 TSAR 372 373.
130 Van Heerden, Cockrell and Keightley (n 118) 544. 
131 s 15(9)(a). See further Sonnekus (n 129) 377-379, who points out that in practice many of the 
acknowledged banks in South Africa are slack in complying with the consent requirements when 
further loan contracts for additional credit on existing bonds are concluded with spouses married in 
community of property and that these banks will be unable to rely on the protection of s 15(9)(a).
132 s 15(9)(b).
133 Barratt (n 129) 275.
134 Barratt (n 129) 275; Heaton (n 112) 79.
135 Amalgamated Bank of South Africa Bpk v Lydenburg Passasiersdienste BK 1995 3 SA 314 (T); 
Amalgamated Banks of South Africa Bpk v De Goede 1997 4 SA 66 (SCA); Bopape v Moloto 2000 1 
SA 383 (T); Visser v Hull 2010 1 SA 521 (WCC).
136 See Barratt (n 129) 277-283 for a discussion of the different possible legal mechanisms for recovery, 
ie the rei vindicatio, enrichment remedies, delictual remedies and the actio Pauliana utilis.
137 See Sonnekus (n 128) 544 and his discussion of the Strydom case (n 128).
138 There are also a few common law remedies which may be available to the prejudiced spouse under 
these circumstances, ie the interdict, the common law right of recourse upon dissolution of the joint 
estate, the actio Pauliana utilis and having the other spouse declared a prodigal.
      
[ISSN 0257 – 7747] TSAR 2015 . 3
DEFAULT MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY REGIMES 555
4.1.2  Liquidation and distribution upon dissolution through divorce
Upon the dissolution of a civil marriage or a civil union in community of property 
through divorce, the balance of the joint estate, after all liabilities have been paid, 
must be divided equally between the spouses,139 unless a forfeiture order is granted 
against one of the parties140 or an adjustment needs to be effected in favour of one 
of them.141 Upon the dissolution of a customary marriage in community of property 
through divorce, the joint estate need not necessarily be divided equally between the 
parties, as in terms of the decision of the constitutional court in Gumede v President 
of Republic of South Africa142 the power of the court to redistribute assets equitably 
upon divorce under section 8(4)(a) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages 
Act 120 of 1998 applies to all customary marriages. In customary marriages a 
general redistributive power therefore co-exists with the default system of universal 
community of property to ensure fairness between the parties upon divorce. No such 
discretion to redistribute assets exists for civil marriages or civil unions concluded 
in community of property, however. Certain legal scholars have advocated the 
introduction of a broad judicial discretion regarding the division of matrimonial 
property upon divorce, because it can no longer be assumed that dividing property 
in accordance with the matrimonial property regime applicable to a marriage would 
invariably lead to a fair and just distribution between divorcing spouses.143
The effective date for the division of the joint estate is the date of the divorce 
order. Until this date, the spouses, who may have separated months before and are 
possibly no longer on speaking terms, will still need to obtain each other’s consent 
for the important transactions referred to above144 and will be unable to acquire 
property solely in their own name.145 The only exceptions are where an application 
in terms of section 20 of the Matrimonial Property Act for the immediate division 
of the joint estate or an application in terms of section 21 for the alteration of the 
matrimonial property system has been approved before the date of the divorce.146
In terms of section 7(1) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, the parties may agree on 
the division of the joint estate in any way that suits them. In such a case a settlement 
agreement will be drafted and incorporated in the divorce order.147 It has been 
decided that a divorce order which incorporates such an agreement has the effect 
of immediately dissolving the joint estate and the parties’ tied co-ownership of the 
139 Heaton (n 112) 66; Sonnekus (n 129) 384; Hahlo (n 111) 382.
140 In terms of s 9 of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. However, s 9 does not provide for the application of the 
principle of fairness in order to deviate from the nature of a marriage in community of property and 
very clear limitations are set for the courts’ discretion in respect of forfeiture orders: Wijker v Wijker 
1993 4 SA 720 (A) 731; Sonnekus “Verbeurdverklaring van voordele – welke voordele?” 2011 TSAR 
787 788.
141 In terms of s 15(9)(b) or s 19 of the Matrimonial Property Act.
142 2009 3 BCLR 24 (CC), 2009 3 SA 152 (CC).
143 Bonthuys “The rule that a spouse cannot forfeit at divorce what he or she has contributed to the 
marriage: an argument for change” 2014 SALJ 439 459; Barratt “‘Whatever I acquire will be mine 
and mine alone’: marital agreements not to share in constitutional South Africa” 2013 SALJ 688 704; 
Heaton “Striving for substantive gender equality in family law: selected issues” 2005 SAJHR 547 
556, 562. Cf Sonnekus “Die onbehoorlike van huweliksvoordele en pacta sunt servanda” 1993 TSAR 
774; Sonnekus (n 109 (2014)) 581.
144 See par 4.1.1. See also Sonnekus (n 129) 383.
145 See Brederveld “Het tijdstip van de ontbinding van de huwelijksgemeenschap bij echtscheiding” 
2010 Actuele Ontwikkelingen in het Familierecht 53 57.
146 See Sonnekus (n 129) 384.
147 Nkosi “A receiver and liquidator in matrimonial affairs: a legal entitlement or a drastic measure?” 
2011:11 De Rebus 22.
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assets of the former joint estate, thereby automatically rendering each spouse sole 
owner of his or her share.148 These decisions have, however, been criticised by legal 
scholars who point out that the divorce order does not automatically terminate the 
co-ownership of the parties.149 It merely replaces the tied co-ownership with free 
co-ownership and individual ownership in shared assets can only vest after delivery 
of movable assets or registration of immovable assets.
Where the parties cannot agree on the manner in which the joint estate is to be 
divided, a prayer for the appointment of a receiver or liquidator to divide the joint 
estate may be included in the divorce summons or, as happens more frequently 
in practice, the parties may approach the court after the granting of the divorce 
order under a separate application for the appointment of a receiver or liquidator 
and possibly again for further directions in the course of such liquidation.150 In these 
circumstances the actual division of the joint estate is postponed until after the 
divorce order has been granted and other ancillary matters such as maintenance 
for the spouses and the interests of children have been decided. This state of affairs 
may, however, have very detrimental consequences for the spouses, who might 
desperately need the capital that they will receive in terms of the actual division of 
the joint estate to pay a deposit on a new home or to finance their relocation costs 
after the divorce, for example.151 It also gives spouses more opportunity to dissipate 
either the assets of the joint estate or their separate property so as to diminish the 
other party’s share of the joint estate or frustrate the other party’s right to a possible 
adjustment.152 It has been pointed out that women are very often the disadvantaged 
spouse in this regard and both the postponement of the division of the joint estate 
and the dissipation of marital assets might be seen as a sex or gender issue.153
Antenuptial contractual debts which are outstanding after the dissolution of the 
joint estate can be recovered only from the original debtor and it is unclear whether 
the original debtor has a right of recourse against the other spouse.154 Contractual 
debts incurred during the subsistence of the marriage and still outstanding upon 
dissolution of the joint estate can be claimed in full from the spouse who incurred 
the debt, or half the debt can be claimed from such spouse and the other half from 
the other spouse. If the spouse who incurred the debt pays the debt in full, he or she 
has a right of recourse for half from the other spouse.155 Delictual and other separate 
debts which are outstanding after the dissolution of the marriage can be claimed 
only from the original debtor and he or she has no right of recourse against the other 
spouse.156
148 the Wiggill case (n 115) 444-445; Middleton v Middleton 2010 1 SA 179 (D) 184A-B.
149 Van Schalkwyk “Huwelik binne gemeenskap van goed: die effek van ’n egskeidingsbevel op ’n 
bateverdelingsooreenkoms” 2012 LitNet Akademies 167 172-176; Bakker (n 116) 519.
150 Van Niekerk A Practical Guide to Patrimonial Litigation in Divorce Actions (RS 10 2008) 3–3-3–4. 
See also Nkosi (n 147) 25, who argues that the appointment of a receiver or liquidator is a legal 
entitlement for the parties where it is not possible for them to settle on an amicable division of their 
joint estate and the value of the joint estate is not of so trivial a nature or value that it does not justify 
such an appointment. 
151 See De Jong “The need for new legislation and/or divorce mediation to counter some commonly 
experienced problems with the division of assets upon divorce” 2012 Stell LR 225 230.
152 See De Jong (n 151) 232-233.
153 De Jong (n 151) 230, 232-233.
154 Heaton (n 112) 73; Hahlo (n 111) 382.
155 Heaton (n 112) 73.
156 Heaton (n 112) 74; Hahlo (n 111) 382-383.
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4.2  The accrual system
4.2.1  Concept
In terms of the accrual system the spouses share equally in the accrual or growth in 
their estates during the subsistence of the marriage. However, while the marriage 
lasts the spouses are basically in the same position as spouses who married out of 
community of property with complete separation of property.157 Therefore, each 
spouse retains the estate he or she had before the marriage and everything which 
a spouse acquires during the subsistence of the marriage falls into his or her own 
estate. Each spouse controls his or her own estate. Except for being jointly and 
severally liable to third parties for debts incurred by either of them in respect of 
household necessaries,158 the spouses are not otherwise liable for each other’s debts.159 
Accrual sharing takes place only at the dissolution of the marriage, at which time 
the spouses benefit equally from the gains or profits made during the marriage.160 
The accrual system is therefore described as a type of postponed community of 
profit or a deferred community of gains.161
During the subsistence of the marriage the spouses’ interest in each other’s 
estates is protected by section 8(1) of the Matrimonial Property Act. It provides that 
a court may, on application by a spouse whose right to share in the accrual of the 
estate of the other spouse at the dissolution of the marriage is being or will probably 
be seriously prejudiced by the conduct of the other spouse, order the immediate 
division of the accrual concerned on an equal or such other basis as the court deems 
just. It appears, however, that this provision does not provide adequate protection 
for spouses.162 If the other spouse has already depleted his or her estate, this remedy 
will not be of any assistance to the prejudiced spouse.
In terms of section 4(1)(a), the accrual in a spouse’s estate must be determined 
by firstly deducting the net value of the spouse’s estate at the commencement of 
the marriage (the net initial value) from the net value of his or her estate upon the 
dissolution of the marriage (the net end value). In terms of section 6(1) of the act, a 
spouse may declare the net initial value of his or her estate in the antenuptial contract 
or in a separate statement either before or within six months of the wedding. If the 
net initial value was not so declared or if a spouse’s liabilities exceeded his or her 
assets at the commencement of the marriage, his or her net initial value is deemed 
to be nil.163 Section 4(1)(b)(iii) further makes provision for the indexation of the net 
initial value of a spouse’s estate. As the depreciation of money is taken into account, 
the net initial values of the spouses’ respective estates are adapted according to the 
weighted average of the consumer price index.164
Secondly, to determine the accrual in a spouse’s estate the value of certain 
excluded assets as listed in sections 4 and 5 of the Matrimonial Property Act must 
also be deducted from the net end value of the spouse’s estate. Such excluded assets 
157 Barratt (n 110) 307; Heaton (n 112) 94; Hahlo (n 111) 304.
158 In terms of s 23(5) of the Matrimonial Property Act.
159 See Sonnekus (n 109 (2014)) 587, who indicates that in an accrual sharing marriage debts are never 
shared commonly. 
160 In terms of s 3(1) and (2) of the Matrimonial Property Act. See also par 4.2.2 below. 
161 Heaton (n 112) 94; Hahlo (n 111) 304.
162 Heaton (n 112) 99; Hahlo (n 111) 308.
163 s 6(4)(a) and (b).
164 As published from time to time in the Government Gazette. The spouses are, however, free to select 
another criterion, such as market value, in their antenuptial contract by which to determine the 
change in the value of all assets.
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comprise the following: any non-patrimonial damages a spouse receives during 
the marriage,165 assets specifically excluded from the accrual in the antenuptial 
contract,166 any inheritance, legacy or donation which a spouse receives during the 
marriage167 and donations inter vivos between the spouses.168 Although some legal 
scholars are of the opinion that prizes which a spouse won in a lottery or competition 
should also be excluded from the accrual in a spouse’s estate,169 the Matrimonial 
Property Act makes no express provision for such prizes to be excluded. The act is 
further not consistent as to whether the proceeds of excluded assets and assets which 
replace such excluded assets are also excluded. With regard to assets excluded in 
the spouses’ antenuptial contract and inheritances, legacies or donations from 
third parties, the act does provide that the proceeds of such assets and assets which 
replace such assets are excluded, but no similar provision is made in respect of non-
patrimonial damages and donations between the spouses. The act is also silent on 
whether or not the value of excluded assets should be expressed in terms of the value 
of money at the dissolution of the marriage.170
4.2.2  Accrual sharing upon dissolution through divorce
In terms of section 3(1) of the Matrimonial Property Act, the party whose estate 
shows the smaller accrual or no accrual at all upon divorce may claim from the 
other spouse an amount equal to half the difference between the accrual in the 
parties’ respective estates. Since section 3(1) refers to the accrual claim as “an 
amount equal to half the difference between the accrual of the respective estates 
of the spouses” (my emphasis), it is clear that the accrual system gives rise to a 
monetary claim only and does not give the spouses rights in respect of each other’s 
property. Furthermore, because of the wording of section 3(1), which stipulates that 
the accrual claim is only acquired upon the dissolution of the marriage by divorce 
(or the death of one or both of the spouses), some authors are of the opinion that 
a new and separate action needs to be instituted after the date of the divorce in 
order to enforce the accrual claim which was acquired on the date of the divorce.171 
This viewpoint was indeed followed in a few unreported cases.172 These cases 
relied on the decision in Reeder v Softline,173 where the court concluded that during 
the subsistence of the marriage one spouse merely has a contingent right to the 
accrual in the other spouse’s estate and that the right becomes vested only when the 
marriage is dissolved, provided of course that there is an accrual. Fortunately, in MB 
v NB,174 Brassey AJ pointed out that although the Reeder case established the date of 
165 s 4(1)(b)(i).
166 s 4(1)(b)(ii). It appears from this section that assets excluded in an antenuptial contract may not also 
be taken into account as part of the net initial value of an estate. In Bath v Bath 2014 JOL 31724 
(SCA) the supreme court of appeal declared an antenuptial contract void for vagueness where inter 
alia the excluded assets were also included in the initial estate of one of the spouses. Cf Sonnekus (n 
109 (2014)) 580 ff, who argues that the decision in the Bath case is incorrect.
167 s 5(1).
168 s 5(2).
169 See Sonnekus “Lotto-wengeld as meevallertjie en aanwasdeling by huweliksontbinding” 2004 
TSAR 365 373; Sonnekus (n 109 (2014)) 583.
170 ie no provision is made for the indexation of excluded assets.
171 See eg Van Niekerk (n 150) 3–13.
172 Willemse v Willemse case no 3600/2004 (OFPD) (unreported); Le Roux v Le Roux case no 1245/2008 
(NCK) (unreported).
173 2000 4 All SA 105 (W), 2001 2 SA 844 (W).
174 2010 3 SA 220 (GSJ) 233C-D.
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a divorce as the moment at which a party’s contingent right to share in the accrual 
of the other party’s estate becomes perfected, this decision did not establish the 
moment at which the respective estates of the parties are to be assessed for purposes 
of determining a party’s accrual claim. The judge stated that for an accrual claim 
to become perfected or payable upon divorce, it has to be determined or quantified 
at an earlier stage. Although he initially proposed to the parties that the cut-off date 
for determining the plaintiff’s accrual claim should be the date on which the parties 
separate, he finally ruled that the decisive date should be the time when pleadings 
close, that is litis contestatio.175 This decision has recently also been followed in MB 
v DB.176 Lopes J remarked that “… it is wholly impractical that parties to a divorce 
should go to the lengths of establishing a right to accrual in the divorce action and 
then have to embark upon a further litigious exercise in order to decide the extent of 
such accrual”.177 If, however, the approach of the unreported cases is followed and 
the adjudication of any accrual claims is postponed to a date after the granting of the 
divorce order, the same undesirable consequences may ensue for spouses, especially 
wives, as when the actual division of the joint estate is postponed to a later stage 
after the divorce order has been granted.178 However, in the case of marriages with 
application of the accrual system, the dissipation of marital assets is an even bigger 
danger as each spouse has exclusive control over his or her estate and may deal with 
it as he or she thinks fit.179
The above rule that the accrual in the spouses’ respective estates must be shared 
equally between the spouses upon divorce is strictly applied where the parties 
concluded a civil marriage or a civil union with application of the accrual system. 
Where the parties concluded a customary marriage with application of the accrual 
system, these rules also apply, but the court may nevertheless order an equitable 
redistribution of assets upon divorce in terms of section 8(4)(a) of the Recognition 
of Customary Marriages Act,180 which may result in a deviation from the rule. As 
mentioned above, pleas have been sounded for a general judicial discretion regarding 
the division of matrimonial property upon divorce in all marriages.181
5  Comparison and recommendations
5.1  General
When examined from a comparative perspective, it appears that some of the rules 
of the primary matrimonial property system specifically, but also the secondary 
matrimonial property system in South Africa, are outdated and in need of reform. As 
there are further specific areas of uncertainty with regard to the primary matrimonial 
property system and furthermore certain problems are encountered with both the 
primary and the secondary matrimonial property systems in South Africa, it would 
be interesting and useful to note what the CEFL Principles determine regarding 
these issues. Since some of the problems encountered in South Africa might well 
result in a sex or gender issue,182 section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic 
175 233D-E.
176 2013 6 SA 86 (KZD).
177 97E.
178 See par 4.1.2. See also De Jong (n 151) 228-231.
179 See De Jong (n 151) 232-233.
180 according to the Gumede case (n 142).
181 See n 143.
182 See 4 1.2.
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of South Africa, 1996, which expressly provides for such cognisance of foreign law, 
also comes into play.183 It would therefore make a lot of sense for our legislature 
to take heed of how the Principles propose that similar problems with the default 
systems in European countries should be dealt with.
5.2  Position of the default and primary matrimonial property system
As regards our default and primary matrimonial property system, the most striking 
difference between it and the European default regime of community of acquisitions 
is that our system is an all-encompassing universal community184 (as in the case of the 
Netherlands185), while their system entails only a limited or restricted community.186 
In other words, in South Africa joint assets include more or less all the assets of the 
spouses, including their respective prenuptial assets, while in Europe community 
property can comprise only property acquired during the community, which in 
most cases means during the marriage.187 It is therefore clear that joint assets in 
South Africa are much more comprehensive than community assets in Europe and 
separate property is much more limited than personal property. The same applies 
to joint and separate debts in South Africa and community and personal debts in 
Europe. This gives rise to the question whether our default system of universal 
community of property is possibly too broad. It is arguably unfair to enforce a 
system with such far-reaching consequences against spouses who probably did not 
even give the specific matrimonial property system much thought before they got 
married. It would undoubtedly seem more reasonable only to allow those spouses 
to benefit from or be prejudiced by the default matrimonial property system while a 
marriage relationship (or marriage-like relationship188) is in existence between the 
spouses. If one keeps in mind that the South African default system is possibly too 
broad and is not in line with the common core of the European community systems, 
it is much easier to propose solutions for some of the uncertainties which currently 
exist in respect of our marriage in community of property.
Therefore, to broaden the scope of separate assets of spouses in South Africa, 
it is firstly proposed that all prenuptial assets of the spouses should become their 
separate property in keeping with Principle 4:36(a).189 Secondly, consideration 
could be given to dealing with bequests and gifts as provided for in Principle 4:35(2)
(c).190 Such a change would ensure that bequests and gifts generally become the 
separate property of the benefited spouse unless the testator or donor provided that 
they should form part of the community between the spouses, unlike the current 
position in South Africa, where bequests and gifts generally form part of the joint 
estate unless the testator or donor provided that they should be excluded from the 
183 See also Sonnekus (n 169) 368 372 and (n 128) 556-557, who feels that even outside the narrow 
confines of the interpretation of the bill of rights, courts have the authority to take cognisance of 
comparable aspects from foreign legal systems. It is submitted that our legislature should also be 
encouraged to take cognisance of comparable aspects of the Principles. 
184 See par 4.1.1. 
185 See par 2.1. 
186 See par 2.1, 3.2 1. See also Boele-Woelki, Ferrand, Beilfuss et al (n 13) 220 (Comment 2).
187 See Boele-Woelki, Ferrand, Beilfuss et al (n 13) 224. 
188 See Boele-Woelki, Ferrand, Beilfuss et al (n 13) 224, who indicate that in Hungary property acquired 
during pre-marital cohabitation becomes community property upon the parties’ marriage. Such a 
provision would indeed seem fair.
189 See par 3.2.1.
190 See par 3.2.1. 
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community between the spouses.191 Thirdly, consideration could also be given to 
making assets exclusively acquired for a spouse’s profession his or her separate 
property, as is provided for in Principle 4:36(e).192
To broaden the scope of separate debts, the Matrimonial Property Act should 
contain a provision similar to the one in Principle 4:41(c),193 namely that all debts 
related to a spouse’s separate property should always be part of that spouse’s separate 
debts. Furthermore, debts which are personal in nature, such as personal fines 
resulting from a criminal sentence or maintenance owed by a spouse to a parent or 
a child from a previous relationship, should also become a spouse’s separate debts, 
in line with Principle 4:41(d). Other than providing that a spouse is liable for his or 
her own delictual damages, our law currently does not really acknowledge or make 
provision for separate debts of spouses married in community of property.194 The 
proposals in this paragraph need to be given serious consideration.
Related to the aspect of separate debts is the current question of whether the 
provisions of section 19 of the Matrimonial Property Act regarding delictual 
damages would also apply to other separate debts of a spouse.195 In the light of the 
fact that our default system is too broad and that a fair arrangement would be for 
the separate debts of a spouse first to be recovered from his or her separate property 
before turning to the joint estate, this question has to be answered in the affirmative. 
Such a provision would also be in line with Principle 4:43(1).196 Section 19 could 
possibly be further amended so as to cap the amount which can be recovered for 
delictual damages from the joint estate to half of the net value of the joint estate, in 
a manner similar to Principle 4:43(2).197 This would provide better protection for the 
other spouse and increase the likelihood of an adjustment with full compensation 
taking place in his or her favour upon divorce.
As regards a related point of uncertainty concerning the South African default 
system, namely whether or not a spouse who pays in full one of his or her antenuptial 
contractual debts, which is still outstanding after the dissolution of the marriage, 
would have a right of recourse against the other spouse,198 for the reasons set out in 
the previous paragraph the answer should be in the negative.
As far as the administration of the joint estate is concerned, it appears from the 
discussion of the position in South Africa that the protection of third parties and 
the non-consenting spouse in circumstances where one spouse transacts without 
the required consent needs better regulation.199 First, it would be a positive step if 
the Matrimonial Property Act were amended to determine in line with Principle 
4:41(e) that debts incurred without the required consent of the other spouse should 
become the separate debts of the transacting spouse.200 Secondly, the Act should 
contain a clear provision similar to the one set out in Principle 4:46 that transactions 
concluded without the required consent may be annulled by the court on application 
by the non-consenting spouse.201 It appears from the comments on Principle 4:46 
191 See Sonnekus (n 140) 790.
192 See par 3.2.1.
193 See par 3.2.1.
194 See par 4.1.1.
195 See par 4.1.1.
196 See par 3.2.1.
197 See par 3.2.1.
198 See par 4.1.2.
199 See par 4.1.1.
200 See par 3.2.1.
201 See par 3.2.1.
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that the protection of the spouses is predominant and that the protection of third 
parties is secondary.202 This would to a certain extent answer some of the questions 
currently being debated in South Africa.203 Unfortunately, Principle 4:46 does not 
address the consequences of lack of consent for the relationship with third parties 
and leaves this specific aspect to national law for determination. No pointers are 
therefore available as to what the particular legal mechanisms should be for the 
recovery of an asset from a mala fide third party.
As regards the rules applicable to the dissolution of the joint estate through 
divorce, there are various valuable lessons which South Africa could learn from 
the Principles. Very importantly, seeing that there is no real marriage relationship, 
solidarity or partnership between spouses from the moment when they separate, 
the effective date for the division of the joint estate between the spouses should, in 
accordance with Principles 4:50(b) and 4:52(1), be either the date of the service of the 
divorce summons, or, if the spouses separated earlier, the date of their separation.204 
Whatever assets are obtained or debts incurred by one spouse after the date of the 
service of the divorce summons or the separation of the spouses should have no 
effect on the other spouse. Such an acceleration of the effective date for the division 
of the joint estate would prevent some problems which might otherwise ensue when 
the actual division of the joint estate is postponed to a later stage after the divorce 
order has been granted.205 It would also minimise the opportunity for spouses to 
dissipate the assets of the joint estate or their separate property.
If the proposals for the expansion of the scope of separate assets and separate 
debts of spouses are accepted in South Africa, more extensive provision needs 
to be made for compensation to and fro between the joint estate and the separate 
property of each spouse so as to avoid unjust enrichment in favour of any of the 
three proprietary masses.206 Such a provision would be necessary as the joint estate 
and the separate property of the spouses are not always kept separate.207
Furthermore, Principle 4:51 could help to achieve clarity on the question of what 
happens to the spouses’ tied co-ownership of joint assets upon the dissolution of the 
community of property. In terms hereof, the general rules of co-ownership apply 
after the dissolution of the community. No provision is made for any automatic 
acquisition of individual ownership, and it seems that the opinion of South African 
legal scholars on this matter should prevail.208
Lastly, as set out in Principle 4:57, it is important that courts should have the 
power to deviate from an equal division of the joint estate or a settlement agreement 
on the division of the joint estate in cases of exceptional hardship.209 Although our 
courts already seem to have a similar power as far as customary marriages are 
concerned,210 it is proposed that they should also have such power when dealing with 
the dissolution of civil marriages and civil unions through divorce. If we are to go by 
the example set in European countries, our courts should have the power to adjust 
the distribution (or modify a settlement agreement) where a rigorous equal division 
of the joint estate (or the terms of the agreement) will result in serious inequity 
202 Boele-Woelki, Ferrand, Beilfuss et al (n 13) 289-290 (Comments 1 and 2).
203 See par 3.2.1. See also Sonnekus (n 128) 544.
204 See par 3.2.2. See also De Jong (n 151) 235.
205 See par 4.1.2.
206 See Principle 4:53 as discussed in par 3.2.2.
207 Boele-Woelki, Ferrand, Beilfuss et al (n 13) 326.
208 See par 4.1.2.
209 See par 3.2.2.
210 See par 4.1.2.
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between the spouses or be detrimental to the best interests of children involved 
in a matter, where a spouse has no income without a justified reason, or when a 
spouse has squandered property to the detriment of the family.211 In some European 
countries, the courts are even allowed to deviate from an equal division by taking 
the contributions of each spouse into account.212
5.3  Position of the secondary matrimonial property system
It is apparent that our secondary matrimonial property system of accrual falls under 
the second model of participation systems in Europe, where spouses participate in 
each other’s profits by way of a statutory compensation clause.213 In a manner similar 
to the German system of Zugewinngemeinshaft, our accrual system distinguishes 
between the net initial and the net end value of a spouse’s estate and similarly to the 
position in Greek law provision is made for the exclusion of certain assets from the 
accrual in a spouse’s estate.214 Although we do not recognise the distinction between 
the two categories of property, namely acquisitions and reserved property (as 
provided for in Principle 4:18 and Principle 4:19),215 there are nevertheless valuable 
lessons to be learnt from the Principles dealing with the European default system of 
participation in acquisitions.
Reserved property in terms of Principle 4:19 roughly coincides with both the net 
initial value of a spouse’s estate and the excluded assets which have to be deducted 
from a spouse’s net end value in terms of our accrual system. It appears from 
Principle 4:19(c) that all assets which replace reserved property are also regarded 
as reserved property, yet in South Africa there is no consistency in the rules on 
substitution as far as the different types of excluded assets are concerned.216 It is 
therefore proposed that the Matrimonial Property Act be amended to make the rules 
with regard to substitution uniformly applicable to all excluded assets. Similarly, 
since Principle 4:19(f) makes provision for increases in the value of all reserved 
property, our act should also make provision for the indexation of all excluded 
assets, specifically where such assets consist of money.217 We could possibly also 
consider categorising assets exclusively acquired for a spouse’s profession218 as 
excluded assets in accordance with Principle 4:19(e).219
It further appears that prizes which a spouse won in a lottery or competition are 
not regarded as reserved property, but form part of acquisitions, as such windfall 
assets are regarded as assets acquired by means of either spouse’s gains in terms of 
Principle 4:18(b).220 The argument of some South African legal scholars that such 
windfall assets should also be excluded from the accrual in a spouse’s estate221 is 
therefore not supported by the Principles.
With regard to the cut-off date for determining the accrual in each spouse’s estate 
and a resultant accrual claim, the Principles indicate that the approach followed in 
211 Boele-Woelki, Ferrand, Beilfuss et al (n 13) 338.
212 eg Poland.
213 See par 2.2 and 3.1.1 as well as the discussion of s 3 of the Matrimonial Property Act in par 4.2.1.
214 See par 3.1.1.
215 See par 3.1.1.
216 See par 4.2.1.
217 See Heaton (n 112) 97 n 90, who notes that where an excluded asset is something other than money, 
indexation is probably unnecessary, as the entire asset is excluded.
218 such as a dentist’s special equipment or a handyman’s tools.
219 See par 4.2.1.
220 See Boele-Woelki, Ferrand, Beilfuss et al (n 13) 154 (Comment 3). See also par 3 1.1 n 38.
221 See par 4.2.1.
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MB v NB and MB v DB, discussed above,222 is to be preferred. The trend is clearly 
towards expediting this date. Once the solidarity between the spouses ends, the 
accrual system should also come to an end and accrual claims should be determined 
as soon as possible. Following the better-law approach, Principle 4:26(1) read with 
Principle 4:25(b)223 endorses the date of the divorce application as the decisive date.224 
It is therefore proposed that the Matrimonial Property Act should similarly make 
the date of the service of the divorce summons the effective date for determining 
possible accrual claims.225 Provision should also be made for recognising an earlier 
cut-off date as agreed upon by the spouses.226 Besides being fair, such provisions 
would also minimise the opportunity for spouses to dissipate their assets upon the 
deterioration of their marriage relationship and in the heat of the moment after 
summons is served,227 which seems to be a real problem for spouses, especially 
wives, who are married subject to the accrual system.228
Related to the matter of the dissipation of marital assets is the protection of a 
spouse whose right to share in the accrual of the other spouse’s estate has been 
unduly reduced by the actions or omissions of the other spouse. In view of the fact 
that the protection provided by section 8 of the Matrimonial Property Act seems to 
be inadequate,229 it is strongly suggested that a provision similar to Principle 4:27230 
should be included in the Matrimonial Property Act. When determining an accrual 
claim, the value of squandered or concealed assets and excessive donations should 
therefore be added to the net end value of the estate of a spouse who acted with the 
intention of diminishing the value of his or her estate to the detriment of his or her 
spouse.
Despite the fact that the accrual system does not make provision for different 
categories of property, it also happens that excluded assets of spouses often get 
intertwined with other assets in the estates of one or both spouses. Our law does 
not make provision for any form of compensation where a husband, for example, 
finances extensive improvements and alterations to a house which his wife inherited 
from her mother. When the accrual in each spouse’s estate has to be determined, 
the house including the value of the improvements and alterations will fall outside 
the accrual of the wife’s estate in terms of section 5(1) of the Matrimonial Property 
Act.231 This situation is clearly unfair and untenable. It is therefore clear that we also 
need provisions for compensation as provided for in Principle 4:28 so as to avoid 
unjust enrichment by one of the spouses in circumstances such as those referred to 
above. 232
Lastly, it is recommended here too233 that our courts should have the power to 
deviate from an equal division of the accrual in the spouses’ respective estates in 
cases of exceptional hardship. In terms of Principle 4:30,234 such a deviation from an 
222 See par 4.2.2.
223 See par 3.1.2.
224 See Boele-Woelki, Ferrand, Beilfuss et al (n 13) 182-183 (Comment 3).
225 See also De Jong (n 151) 233-235.
226 See De Jong (n 151) 237, who notes that this date should be set for as soon as possible after the 
breakdown of the marriage relationship between the parties and the decision to get divorced. 
227 See De Jong 2012 (n 151) 234.
228 See par 4.2.2. 
229 See par 4.2.1.
230 See par 3.1.2.
231 See 4.2 1. See also Heaton (n 112) 97 n 90.
232 See par 3.1.2.
233 As is also proposed above in par 5.2 in respect of marriage in community of property.
234 See par 3.1.2.
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equal split of acquisitions can mean that an equalisation claim is denied, reduced or 
increased by the court. Although our courts already appear to have a similar power 
as far as customary marriages are concerned,235 it is proposed that they should also 
have the power to effect a redistribution when dealing with the dissolution of civil 
marriages and civil unions through divorce. The circumstances under which our 
courts may exercise such power ought to be similar to those under which it would 
be justified for our courts to deviate from an equal division of the joint estate in 
the case of marriages in community of property.236 As already mentioned above,237 
such a deviation should inter alia be ordered where a rigorous equal division of the 
accrual in the spouses’ respective estates would result in serious inequity between 
spouses or be detrimental to the best interests of children involved in a matter.
6  Conclusion
As was illustrated above, an exploration of the CEFL Principles made it possible to 
find and propose fair and equitable solutions for many of the problem areas relating 
to both the primary and the secondary matrimonial property systems in South 
Africa. It was also possible to identify areas where our systems, specifically the 
default system of universal community of property, are out of sync with modern 
trends.
There is indeed no reason why the CEFL Principles should be restricted to Europe 
as a source of inspiration for future family law reform. Furthermore, as equality 
between the spouses forms the basis of all the CEFL Principles238 and as the best 
interests of children are acknowledged in many of the principles,239 it is evident that 
the above proposals and recommendations would also be constitutionally valid. It is 
therefore sincerely hoped that our legislator will consider the above proposals and 
recommendations, which are based on the CEFL Principles, when future family law 
reforms are undertaken.
SAMEVATTING
VERSTEKHUWELIKSGOEDEREBEDELINGS EN DIE BEGINSELS VAN DIE EUROPESE 
FAMILIEREG – ’N EUROPEES–SUID-AFRIKAANSE VERGELYKING
Hierdie artikel verskaf ’n tipologie van die Europese verstekhuweliksgoederebedelings en bespreek 
die beginsels van die huweliksgoederereg vanuit ’n Europees–Suid-Afrikaanse perspektief.
Deel 1 begin met ’n breë agtergrondbespreking van die verskillende Europese verstekstelsels, synde 
die gemeenskapstelsels wat veral voorkom in die tradisioneel Romeinse regstelsels (insluitende België, 
Frankryk, Luxembourg, Portugal, Italië, Spanje en Nederland), die aanwinstestelsels wat geld in 
Noorweegse en Germaanse regstelsels (insluitende Oostenryk, Duitsland, Switserland en Griekeland) 
en die skeidingstelsels wat aanwending vind in sekere streke in Spanje.
Daarna word die Kommissie op Europese Familiereg se beginsels aangaande die twee hoof Europese 
verstekstelsels, te wete deelname in aanwinste en gemeenskap van aanwinste, in meer besonderhede 
bespreek. Hierdie beginsels volg die gemeenskaplike kern van die tersaaklike beginsels van die 
verskillende Europese regstelsels en by gebreke aan so ’n gemeenskaplike kern, die mees aangewese 
regsbenadering.
By die stelsel van deelname in aanwinste word verder onderskei tussen stelsels wat ’n onderskeid 
tref tussen twee kategorieë van eiendom, naamlik eksklusiewe eiendom en gemeenskaplike eiendom, 
235 See par 4.2.2.
236 See par 5.2.
237 See par 5.2.
238 See Boele-Woelki, Ferrand, Beilfuss et al (n 13) 41.
239 See Principles 4:4, 4:30, 4:32, 4:56 and 4:57(2).
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en stelsels wat slegs voorsiening maak vir ’n monetêre eis by die ontbinding van die huwelik. Onder die 
stelsel van deelname in aanwinste tel ook die Anglo-gemeneregstelsels waar nie regtig sprake is van 
’n verstekhuweliksgoederebedeling nie, maar wel voorsiening gemaak word vir ’n regterlike diskresie 
om bates by egskeiding op ’n billike wyse tussen die partye te verdeel. By die stelsel van deelname 
in aanwinste ontstaan daar dus as’t ware ’n uitgestelde gemeenskap van goed by ontbinding van die 
huwelik deur egskeiding.
By die stelsel van gemeenskap van aanwinste bestaan daar by alle Europese regstelsels drie 
vermoënsregtelike entiteite, naamlik die persoonlike eiendom van elke gade en die gemeenskaplike 
eiendom. Dit is belangrik om daarop te let dat met uitsondering van die posisie in Nederland, die 
gemeenskap van goed ’n beperkte gemeenskap is in die sin dat slegs die bates en laste wat gedurende 
die bestaan van die huwelik verkry of aangegaan is deel uitmaak van die gemeenskaplike eiendom wat 
by egskeiding gelykop tussen die partye verdeel moet word. Daar bestaan gevolglik in die reël ’n veel 
groter poel van persoonlike bates en laste vir elke gade.
In deel 2 word die Suid-Afrikaanse verstekhuweliksgoederebedeling van algehele gemeenskap van 
goed en die aanwasbedeling as ’n soort tweede verstekstelsel ondersoek met klem op die probleemareas 
waar ons stelsels moontlik hersiening benodig.
By die huwelik binne gemeenskap van goed word ondersoek ingestel of ons universele gemeenskap 
moontlik te omvattend is. Verder word aandag geskenk aan probleme rondom die aanwendingsveld van 
artikel 19 van die Wet op Huweliksgoedere 88 van 1984, die hantering van voorhuwelikse kontraktuele 
skulde na die ontbinding van die gemeenskaplike boedel, die administrasie van die gemeenskaplike 
boedel met klem op die beskermingsmeganismes tussen gades onderling by die aangaan van transaksies 
sonder die nodige toestemming, die uitstel van die verdeling van die gemeenskaplike boedel tot ’n 
datum na egskeiding, die effek van ’n egskeidingsbevel op gades se gebonde mede-eiendomsreg ten 
opsigte van bates van die voormalige gemeenskaplike boedel en die billikheid van ’n streng afdwinging 
van gemeenskap van goed by egskeiding.
By die aanwasbedeling word onder andere gekyk na probleme aangaande die inkonsekwente 
hantering van bates wat uitgeslote bates vervang, die moontlike hantering van toevallige meevallers 
(soos prysgeld) as uitgeslote bates, die uitstel en afsonderlike hantering van gades se aanwaseise by 
egskeiding, die beskerming van ’n gade se reg stante matrimonio om by die ontbinding van die huwelik 
in die ander gade se aanwas te deel en die billikheid van ’n streng afdwinging van die aanwasbedeling 
by egskeiding.
Daarna volg ’n vergelyking tussen die Europese stelsels en die Suid-Afrikaanse stelsels met die 
doel om moontlike oplossings vir die tersaaklike probleemareas te identifiseer en ander voorstelle ter 
verbetering van ons stelsel te maak. Aangesien die regsvergelykende metode ons in staat stel om te 
leer uit die ervaring in buitelandse jurisdiksies kan dit tot vernuwing, ontwikkeling en verbetering van 
die Suid-Afrikaanse stelsel lei. Daar bestaan trouens geen rede waarom die Kommissie op Europese 
Familiereg se beginsels as ’n bron van inspirasie vir toekomstige huweliksgoedereregshervorming tot 
Europa beperk moet word nie.
      
